Last Gasp of the ASA

"Last Gasp of the ASA" by Duncan Brown
duncanancy@mindex.com
337th RRC, 370th ASA OPS

I was telling my father-in-law about this ASA web page, when he mentioned that he had worked with ASA in its last days. Although employed by private business and now retired, he had done much consulting work for many federal agencies, including the Army Scientific Advisory Panel.
Here is his story.

One of the Closing Moments of the Army Security Agency

It was in the mid seventies (probably 1975), when the Deputy Secretary of the Army assigned the Army Scientific Advisory Panel (ASAP) the task of examining the current mission-effectiveness of the Army Security Agency. An Army Scientific Advisory Panel Special Panel was formed (with myself as chairman) to look into the effectiveness of ASA in supporting the Field Army in light of the emergence of modern electronic-controlled battlefield weapons that the USSR was reported to have under development.

The Special Panel's investigation revealed (as the Dept. of Army suspected) that the then-current balance of battlefield efforts of the ASA was heavily oriented toward the intercept of Communications Intelligence (COMINT) but seriously lacked the ability to intercept Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) that could provide the direct and real-time support that the Army needed during battle conditions, particularly in providing timely warning of enemy radar-controlled search and missile/anti-aircraft fire actions against U.S. Army aircraft on the modern battlefield.

The task of presenting these results to the Dept. of Army fell on the Special Panel Chairman (myself). I emphasized this COMINT/ELINT imbalance inside ASA by pointing out that 90% of the ASA annual funding budget supported COMINT activities while only 10% went to ELINT. I went on to recommend that the budgetary imbalance should be more properly reversed, with 90% of the ASA budget going to ELINT and 10% to COMINT; and, to put the matter strongly, I alleged that if ASA failed to correct the imbalance, ASA could be accused of abrogating its responsibilities to support the Army in battle!

A member of the audience who heard the allegation was the Commander of ASA, Brig. Gen. George Godding, who then asked me to meet him in his office at ASA Headquarters the next morning. Obviously, in my mind, some kind of showdown was imminent, and it would appear that the full wrath of this part of the Army was about to descend upon me.

At the meeting the next morning, however, an interesting thing happened. Gen. Godding, instead of carving me up in little pieces, told me that everything I had said in the Special Panel's presentation was true, and (much to my surprise) asked me if I would help him reorient the mission of ASA to substantially strengthen ASA's role in actively supporting the Army on the battlefield.

I agreed to do that, and thereupon formed a new panel under the auspices of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel to pursue the task, estimated to run about six months.

During the weeks that followed, the Panel conducted a thorough review of the current ASA operations (with the enthusiastic support of Gen. Godding and his immediate staff) and was well on its way toward helping form a reorientation of the responsibilities and budgets of ASA.

Then, at about the three-month point, suddenly and without warning, the Dept. of Army abolished the ASA organization!

I was not privy to the events inside the Army that led to the dissolution of ASA, but my impression was that the operating Commands felt that ASA was not providing enough positive support to the Army in the field to justify its existence --- which was similar to the conclusion expressed by the Army Scientific Advisory Panel some months previously. However, the Army Scientific Advisory Panel thought that the situation could be corrected inside the existing ASA; whereas, the Dept. of Army apparently felt it was better to dissolve the ASA and start all over again to provide the needed functions in some other organizational form.