Military Review
VOL LXI, NO. 03 -- MARCH 1981 -
EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD :
SOVIET RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT IN WORLD WAR II
With daily advances being made in the field of electronics, it can be assumed that the role of electronic warfare will continue to grow in importance and play a larger part in future conflicts. This article examines Soviet use of electronic warfare in World War 11 and speculates about future employment of tactical electronic warfare that has come of age on the modern battlefield. The expanding role of communications electronics for effective command and control of forces in rapidly changing combat environments has assured that EW will remain a permanent fixture in the field commander’s perceptions, plans ,and course of action in any future combat environment,
Any possible military confrontation with Soviet forces, whether In Europe, the Middle East or other parts of the world, will see high-intensity EW techniques employed by both sides. Concermng this topic, the primary responsibility of the field commander is to expand his knowledge of the Soviet EW threat. Part of this responsibility may be accomplished by examining the Soviet military’s view of the historical role of radio-electronic combat (REC) in their ground forces operations during World War II
For the Soviet commander, the World War II expierience of Soviet forces offers specific lessons which are readily adapted in a more complex form to modern combat conditions. Accounts of their REC experience on the Eastern Front presents instructive accounts of how commanders may apply REC forces under modern conditions against large armored and mechanized units.
David R. Beachley
The Early WarYears
Soviet authors describe World War II as a period of "intensive radio- electronic combat" with German forces. They outline the "wide application" of radio reconnaissance, radio- electronic Jamming and radio disinformation by Soviet forces 1
The Soviet army was clearly taken off guard by the massive German EW effort at the beginning of the war, especially their voice intercept operations. Soviet authors cite how some commanders "groundlessly" took "sharp measures" and completely forbade the use of radios. They were fearful of detection by German voice intercept and radio direction tinding and the subsequent posslblllty of artillery or air strikes on their positions Moreover, some commanders placed their communications equipment a considerable distance from command points which ?????? its general use, These cases of "so-called radio fear" were criticized due to inaccurate German direction finding and artillery’s inability to "accurately hit radio stations and command points. "~ Soviet forces were ill -prepared for the formidable German EW effort. The war was well underway before the Soviets would redress their problems and turn the tide of the REC battle against the German forces.
First Offensive Capabilities
During 1942, the Soviet Command began development of its offensive REC (RADIO- ELECTRONIC COMBAT ) capabilities. Radio voice Intercept was introduced to perform three vital missions against German forces, It was employed to:".....create disinformation., create jamming to interrupt the "’most Important" radio transmissions.,and aid in the destruction of artillery and aviation command points along with communications centers. "Special attention" was given to the intercept of tank and aviation units where radio was the primary means of communications, Jamming operations were geared to disrupt high- level command structures. According to Soviet sources, jamming, which was created "in the course of combat operations," disrupted radio communications of the commands of German army groups, field and tank armies, tank and motorized corps and divisions and also those combined operations with aviation units. The Battle of Stalingrad in late 1942 witnessed "the first complete in history use of all three types of radio- electronic combat" (Intercept, Jamming and disinformation)
Employed by Soviet forces. heavy radio reconnaissance was initiated against German units. after the encirclement of the 6th Field Army of Friedrich von Paulus located west of Stalingrad, The 394th Sectional Radio Battalion was employed to conduct intercept and jamming operations against the German forces. Utilizing the call signs of Erich von Manstein’s relief force, Army Group "Don," Soviet radio operators entered into communications with the beleaguered 6th Army and accepted messages addressed to headquarters of Army Group "Don" and the German High Command. "Eighty- six operational radio-Warnings" were received from the 6th Army during these operations. Soviet offensive REC capabilities were well underway. ‘
Special REC Battalions
In late 1942 and 1943, Stauka, the headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command, activated five special radio battalions specifically designed to conduct REC operations— especially jamming- against German forces.
The 129th, 130th, 131st, 132d and 226th "Special Radio Battalions" are cited as the "first units of radio- electronic jamming." Their deployment is described as a "...qualitative jump in the development of radio. electronic combat In the Soviet Army."
After activation, each battalion was assigned to various front (army group) level commands. Each of these special units was equipped for radio intercept, jamming and direction-finding operations with eight to 10 vehicle mounted jammers, 18 to 20 Radio Intercept receivers and four direction. finding sets. Captured German radios were used for more effective disinformation operationss Primary targets of these special units were "operational- tactical 1inks" of army, corps and division- level communications systems. Operations were designed to expose main and reserve frequencies of radio stations, their locations and also the equipment and activlty of enemy forces.
Jamming operations against key radio-nets employed two jammers to cover both main and reserve frequencies. This provided "uninterrupted interference" against the targeted enemy communications system
Kurak: The Baptism of Fire
The operations of the special radio battalions at the Battle of Kursk in July 1943 offer, a unique opportunity to observe Soviet REC operations in highly mobile defensive and offensive combat
Initially, radio intercept helped to uncover "completely" the composition of opposing German forces. According to Soviet sources, much of this data was provided by radio reconnaissance up to two weeks before the battle began. During the defensive stage of the battle, the 130th Radio Battalion conducted jamming against corps and division headquarters of German units attacking toward Kursk, Soviet sources maintain that "the primary mission of the first order was to inhibit or exclude the reception of ciphered radiograms of the enemy."
After Soviet forces went over to the counterattack and general offensive, the 130th and 132d Radio Battalions jammed headquarters of the 4th Tank Army, 8th Army, 48th Tank and 52d Army Corps, Army Corps "Raus" and their subordinate divisions along with aviation communications. Especially interesting is that: during the course of the offensice the 130th continued to jam the formations and major field forces of the enemy retreating under the fire of the Soviet Army
Radio operators practiced imitative operations against German forces, relaying false and misleading ciphered messages. This practice "loaded down" German communication lines. Soviet authorities maintain that, during the course of the Battle of Kursk and the following offensive operations, the 132d Radio Battalion jammed up to 3,500 enemy radio messagee. Under jamming conditions, the Germans were capable of transmitting less than 30 percent of their "operational radiograms." The two radio battalions‘jammed the main communications of the enemy, hindered control, and promoted the utter defeat of German- Fascist forces." 7 ]
RADIO- ELECTRONIC COMBAT
Operations Against Encircled Forces
Soviet military writings outllne numerous examples of REC operations by the radio battalions aga] nst encircled German forces. In fact, they clalm that "the greatest results" of REC operations "were reached in the suppression of radlo communications of command points in the course of encirclement and destruction of large groupings of the enemy." Jamming was "especially effective" In operations against surrounded units since it was designed to conduct "a complete radio blockade of enemy forces."" Operations during the Belorussian offensive of 1944 provide numerous examples of successful Jamming missions against encircled German forces,
The 130th and 131st Radio Battalions, played an "active part" In the Belorussian Camp Both units conducted Jamming operations against German units surrounded in the area of Vitebesk and southeastern Minsk. "Special attention" was given to. Jamming the communicatlons of the 9th Army "which was known from intercepted radiograms" to be preparing a breakthrough out of the encirclement In addition the 131st Radio Battallon conducted jamming operations against headquarters of the 3d Tank and 4th Armys attempting to communicate with sister forces surrounded east of Minsk. Jamming 70 radio nets, the battalion disrupted more than 3,700 radio messages or up to 90 percent of all radio traffic. Soviet sources maintain that 30 "highly important operational radiograms" of forces surrounded east of Minsk were jammed.: ‘ Other examples illustrate the Soviet military’s employment of REC forces against isolated and surrounded units.
From January through February 1945, the operations of the 130th and 132d Radio Battalions aided in the destruction of encircled German units in Glog6w, Breslau and Posen. The operations of the 132d are considered "especially instructive" since the battalion successfully jammed communications between the encircled units and between these units and relief forces outside of the encirclement. "Special attention" was given to jamming the communications of air transports bringing in supplies to the encircled forces, causing crews to lose their bearings to designated drpp zones. Commenting on the effectiveness of REC operations against the encircled forces, Soviet authorities maintain that the radio battalions "significantly" interrupted the command and control of German forces and the combined operations between the encircled groupings in Breslau, Glogow and Posen. "This promoted their rapid destruction." 1"
Similar results are reported on the operations of the 226th and 131st Radio Battalions In the eastern Prussia operations of early 1945. These units jammed "practically all" radio commumcations of enemy groups of forces, consisting of 175 radio stations in 30 radio nets on 300 various frequencies. Once again, REC is credited with a significant contribution to successful operations. "Radio- jamming in a great degree promoted the success of Soviet forces In the Eastern Prussia operation. "!!
The Lessons of Berlin
Soviet sources maintain that REC "reached perfection" during the offensive operations against Berlin. In the preparatory operation, "frontal radio reconnaissance" uncovered enemy radio communications systems and located headquarters of armies, corps and divisions "in spite of limited radio use and fraudulent operations.," The special radio battalions played a major role in the offensive. "Utilizing the data collected by radio reconnaissance and their great accumulation of battle experience," the special radio battalions "were completely successful in jamming radio communications of the enemy in the course of all operations. "
Participating in the final assault on Berlin were the 130th and 132d Radio Battalions. The jamming operations of the 130th against Army Group "Vistula," the 3d and 9th Tank Armies and their subordlinate and neighboring units are especially instructive about the objectives of offensive Soviet REC: Not able to establish communications, the army headquarters did not know the situation, was not able to lead its subordinate formations and coordinate its actions with actions of its forces attempting to help the surrounded groups. As a result, divisions were thrown in various directions,and were not able to organizationally conduct combat operations in order to pull out of the encirclement and were "liquidated by Soviet forces.
Lower Echelon REC Operations
Although the special radio battalions provided essential REC support to frontal combat operations, a more widespread application of offensive capabilities was necessary, especially in army- level operations and in the operations of smaller echelons. With the "increase in the sweep of front and army offensive operations" and the "shortening of the time of their preparation," it was necessary to develop "new ways to receive supplementary Intelligence and to increase the effectiveness of reconnaissance. "1
Soviet military writings outllne at least one example of the formation and operation of a special REC unit designed toexpand intelligence collection in arrny -level and lower echelon operations. In July 1944, a group for conducting operational radio reconnaissance was formed in the 61st Army of the 1st Belorussian Force and attached to the 106th Communications Regiment. This platoon-size formation was called the "group of close reconnaissance with communications means" or, as abbreviated by Soviet writings,the GBRSS.
According to Soviet authorities, the operations of the GBRSS and the organization of reconnaissance in the 61st Army "offer special interest" under modern conditions. The GBRSS paid "special attention" to the monitoring of German artillery communications in order to determine Soviet forces targeted for fire." The timely receipt of this information permitted Soviet troops to withdraw from targeted areas and avoid unnecessary losses. Moreover, the unit’s operations established order of battle intelligence on Opposing Forces.,Radio station accessories, names of commanders and locations of enemy subunits in the defense were determined "without great difficulty."
During the Vistula Oder offensive, the GBRSS intercepted regimental, battalion and company level communications and uncovered at least five planned counterattacks by company and battalion- level forces. In addition, the GBRSS intercepted units of the 10th SS Tank Division which were transmitting their locations and planned cutoff points,includlng the schedule for their occupation. Soviet military sources comment on the impact of GBRSS operations In the 61st Army: ....the presence zn the Army of the group of close reconnaissance with communications means for conduction of operational reconnaissance provided the receipt of important and reliable lntelllgence on the enemy, won by the utilization of usual radio communications and in the absence of special direction finding systems, 5
Conclusion
Soviet offensive REC operations in World War H are credited with expanding the role of artillery and air support through effective radio intercept and direction finding on command points, communications centers and radar posts. Soviet authorities claim that " . . the greatest results [of REC operations] were reached in the suppression of radio communications of command points in the course of encirclement and destruction of large groupings of the enemy." In addition, radio disinformation operations deluded the enemy and "at the same time, promoted the achievement of surprise. "l
The preponderance of Radio Jamming during REC operations certainly indicates that its application was the primary means of offensive electronic combat against command and control communications systems throughout the Eastern Front operations.
Although radio intercept and direction finding receive less attention by Soviet authors, this certainly does not minimize their contribution to successful combat operations. The wide application of radio reconnaissance prior to offensive operations established an extensive order of battle data base against German forces not employing proper radio camouflage and protective meaeures.
Soviet military writings on REC operations on the Eastern Front are certainly not the definitive source on the organization and operations of offensive Soviet REC units and tactics. Nevertheless, they do provide us with a unique opportumty to view the historical role of offensive REC units and their operations through the eyes of the Soviet commander.
Under modern conditions, a more perfected and elaborate REC organization can pose a formidable arm of Soviet ground forces operations against an opposing force not properly utilizing authorized radio procedures and signal security measures. Our operational commanders should never forget what Soviet military writers clearly state:"... not one operation of any type of armed forces does not begin with or is not conducted without the ??? use of forces and means of radio electronic combat. 17
NOTES (The notes were too dificult to OCR and so have been left out...Researchers should refer to the VOL LXI, NO. 03 MARCH 1981 - issue of Military Review in which this article is contained ....md)